THE PROPOSITION THAT FREE MARKETS, OPEN TRADE, AND SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH WOULD "SOFTEN" ASIA'S AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, NURTURE DEMOCRATIC STATES, AND MAKE ASIA MORE PEACEFUL AND MORE SECURE HAS BECOME PART OF OUR CONVENTIONAL WISDOM.

YET, ALTHOUGH ASIA TODAY IS CERTAINLY MUCH RICHER THAN IT WAS A GENERATION AGO, IT IS ALSO ALMOST AS UNSTABLE AS IT USED TO BE.  REGIONAL SECURITY STILL IS A BASIC PROBLEM -- JUST AS IT WAS A GENERATION AGO.

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE CRISIS HAS BREACHED ASEAN UNITY AND WEAKENED THE GROUPING'S INFLUENCE ON THE LARGER EAST ASIAN REGION.

IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, DOUBTS ARE BEING EXPRESSED ABOUT ASEAN'S EFFECTIVENESS.

GENERALLY, MANY THINK ASEAN SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE TO MITIGATE THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN INDONESIA.

AND, DURING THE  EAST TIMOR TROUBLES,  ASEAN -- DEFERRING TO JAKARTA'S OFFICIALDOM -- ENDED UP SUPPORTING THE INTERVENTION OF THE WESTERN POWERS.

MORE RECENTLY, THE LACK OF A FIRM CONSENSUS ON A COMMON APPROACH TO THE SPRATLYS PROBLEM AMONG THREE OF THE FOUR SOUTHEAST ASIAN CLAIMANTS IS COMPLICATING ASEAN'S EFFORTS TO RESPOND COLLECTIVELY TO CHINESE INCURSIONS INTO ITS MARITIME HEARTLAND.

IN EVERY ONE OF THESE CRISES, ASEAN'S "NON-INTERFERENCE" PRINCIPLE CONTINUES TO HOBBLE THE ASSOCIATION, PREVENTING IT FROM TAKING PURPOSEFUL ACTION.

ULTIMATELY, ASEAN MUST BE MEASURED AGAINST THE PURPOSES -- AND THE LIMITATIONS -- IT HAD ORIGINALLY SET FOR ITSELF WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1967.

ASEAN WAS NEVER MEANT TO BE A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY - ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS MEMBERS.  ASEAN MAKES NO LAWS; AND IT HAS NEITHER POWERS OF ENFORCEMENT NOR A JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

I MUST ALSO SAY THAT, OVER THESE NEXT FEW YEARS, ASEAN MUST UNDERGO SOME RE-ENGINEERING -- IF IT IS TO KEEP PACE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA'S EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES.  BECAUSE SOUTHEAST ASIA MUST BECOME MORE CLOSELY INTEGRATED, ASEAN'S MEMBER-STATES MUST SEEK A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL PURPOSE.

MEANWHILE, INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS COULD PREVENT IT FROM ACTING AS THE LINCHPIN OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY.  INSTABILITY IN THE ARCHIPELAGO -- WHICH STRADDLES THE STRATEGIC SEALANES BETWEEN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC -- COULD BECOME ENDEMIC IF DEMOCRACY PRODUCES ONLY A SUCCESSION OF WEAK CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS IN JAKARTA.

INTERNATIONAL LOANS AND AID ARE HELPING TO KEEP INDONESIA GOING, BUT THESE CAN ONLY BE PALLIATIVES UNTIL INDONESIAN LEADERS RESTORE CONFIDENCE BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD IN THEIR ECONOMY AND THEIR POLITICAL STABILITY.

IN MYANMAR, NEITHER AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT BY THE WESTERN POWERS NOR "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT" BY ASEAN HAS SOFTENED THE RULING GENERALS, WHO CONTEST WITH NORTH KOREA THE ASIAN RECORD OF THE MOST DURABLE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME.

BY CLOSING THEIR COUNTRIES TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, BOTH REGIMES HAVE SHIELDED THEMSELVES FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCE -- BUT AT GREAT COST TO THEIR PEOPLES.

PRESSED BY ITS ASEAN PARTNERS, THE YANGON JUNTA HAS RELUCTANTLY OPENED TALKS WITH ITS OPPOSITION NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD).  MEANWHILE, MYANMAR'S ECONOMY IS SUSTAINED ONLY BY CROSS-BORDER SMUGGLING ON WHICH THE REGIME TURNS A BLIND EYE.  INDEED, ARMED REBELLION SEEMS TO BE BREWING ON THE MYANMAR-THAILAND BORDER -- A CONTINGENCY LIKELY TO STRAIN RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO ASEAN MEMBERS.

THREE MAJOR POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS

ASIA'S MAJOR POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS ARE THREE:  THE KOREAN PENINSULA; THE UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN; AND THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN OVER KASHMIR.

LOCKED IN TO INWARD-LOOKING ECONOMIC POLICIES DATING BACK TO THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN LARGELY MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO GROW RAPIDLY THAT THE EXPORT BOOM BROUGHT TO EAST ASIA.  BOTH COUNTRIES STILL HAVE OLIGARCHIC ELITES, TINY MIDDLE CLASSES, AND MASSES OF POOR PEOPLE.

THE KASHMIR ISSUE STILL FEEDS RELIGIOUS FANATICISM ON BOTH SIDES.  INDEED, GOVERNMENTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE MILITARY ADVENTURISM CAN BE GOOD FOR INTERNAL POLITICS.

AS NUCLEAR STATES, BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN MAY BE EXERCISING MORE RESTRAINT THAN BEFORE -- BUT THEY ARE STILL SO FAR AWAY FROM A ONCE-AND-FOR-ALL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR MUTUAL GRIEVANCES.  MEANTIME, THE REST OF US MUST CONTINUE TO DREAD WHAT CATASTROPHES COULD HAPPEN IN THE SUBCONTINENT -- THE NEXT TIME AROUND.

GLIMMERS OF HOPE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

IN NORTHEAST ASIA, SOUTH KOREA IS LEADING REGIONAL RECOVERY; BUT JAPAN CONTINUES TO BE IMMERSED IN ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS.  ITS FAILURE TO RESUSCITATE ITS ECONOMY IS PROLONGING EAST ASIA'S CRISIS.
PYONGYANG'S EFFORTS TO REPAIR ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH SEOUL AND WASHINGTON HAS MITIGATED THE CRISIS SET OFF BY NORTH KOREA'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEM.

WHILE AID HAS BEEN OFFERED TO NORTH KOREA'S FALTERING ECONOMY, PYONGYANG'S MISSILE THREAT HAS ALSO STAMPEDED SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN INTO SPEEDING UP THEIR OWN MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS.  SEOUL IS NEGOTIATING WITH WASHINGTON FOR NEW LIMITS ON THE REACH OF ITS MISSILE WEAPONRY.  AND TOKYO HAS AGREED TO TAKE PART IN AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR THE UMBRELLA COVERAGE OF JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC AREAS BY A THEATER-MISSILE-DEFENSE (TMD) SYSTEM.

IN ADDITION, TOKYO IS LAUNCHING ITS OWN "SPY" SATELLITES -- TO GIVE IT INDEPENDENT EARLY WARNING OF ANY POTENTIAL MISSILE THREAT TO ITS HEARTLAND (AGAINST WHICH IT HAS DECLARED IT RESERVES THE RIGHT OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE).  BY DISTURBING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA, THIS TMD AGREEMENT IS LIABLE TO RAISE RENEWED ANXIETIES IN BEIJING.

IN NORTHEAST ASIA, AS ON THE INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER, REGIONAL SECURITY IS HOSTAGE TO BRINKMANSHIP, STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS AND THE PARANOID AMBITIONS OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS.

IN TAIWAN, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEMOCRATIZATION ARE RAISING THE ODDS AGAINST REUNIFICATION.  GENERATIONS OF TAIWANESE ARE GROWING UP WITHOUT THE CULTURAL AND ETHNIC LINKS TO THE MAINLAND THEIR ELDERS HAD -- AND THE DEEPENING OF TAIWAN'S DEMOCRACY IS INCREASING THE PRESSURE THEY CAN EXERT ON THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS.  FORTUNATELY, CROSS-STRAITS TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARE PULLING THE ISLAND IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MAINLAND.

THE PHILIPPINES CONCERN LIES MAINLY IN HOW TAIWAN IS REUNITED WITH THE P.R.C. -- BECAUSE ANY PROTRACTED INSTABILITY ON THE TAIWAN STRAITS WOULD BE LIFE-THREATENING TO THE WHOLE REGION.

A POLITICAL SOLUTION -- PROBABLY YEARS AWAY -- IS LIKELY TO INCORPORATE A FEDERALIST FRAMEWORK SIMILAR TO THAT BEIJING HAS WORKED OUT WITH BOTH HONG KONG AND MACAU.  FEDERALISM WILL HAVE THE ADDITIONAL VIRTUE OF FORMALIZING THE BALANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER EVOLVING BETWEEN BEIJING AND ITS INCREASINGLY-ASSERTIVE PROVINCES.  SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WILL ALSO MITIGATE SECESSIONISM IN THE "OUTER PROVINCES" WHICH ARE NOT WELL INTEGRATED INTO THE NATIONAL CULTURE.

II.  THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP IS STILL THE MAIN ISSUE

EAST ASIA'S FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON HOW CHINA, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES STRUCTURE THEIR RELATIONSHIPS.  THESE THREE POWERS HAVE BEEN THE PRINCIPAL PROPS OF EAST ASIA'S BALANCE OF POWER SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR.

THE BENIGN "HEGEMONY" THE UNITED STATES IS ABLE TO EXERCISE IN THE REGION (AND IN THE WORLD) DERIVES FROM ITS COMMANDING LEAD IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL -- AND IDEOLOGICAL -- REVOLUTION.

BOTH JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA ARE TRYING TO REDUCE THEIR RELIANCE FOR DEFENSE ON THE UNITED STATES.  BUT, IN STRATEGIC TERMS, NO STABLE COUNTERWEIGHT TO CHINA IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE AMERICAN PRESENCE.

ULTIMATELY, IT IS THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE THAT UNDERPINS ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY.  AS A SIDE-BENEFIT, IT ALSO PROVIDES CHINA AND EAST ASIA ASSURANCE AND COMFORT THAT THE JAPANESE WILL NOT REARM.

THE PHILIPPINES WELCOMES U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS AS AN EARNEST OF ITS GUARANTEES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY.  THE PHILIPPINE SENATE LAST YEAR RATIFIED A VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA) UNDER THE PHILIPPINES-U.S. MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1951, WHICH SHOULD ENHANCE THE INTER-OPERABILITY OF OUR TWO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

HOW WILL CHINA EXERCISE ITS REGIONAL PRE-EMINENCE?

MEANWHILE, CHINA'S ENTRY INTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SHOULD WORK TO DEEPEN ITS ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION.  IT WILL ALSO RESULT -- UNAVOIDABLY -- IN SOME FURTHER LOOSENING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLITICAL CONTROL.

RAPID GROWTH THESE PAST 20 YEARS HAS CAUGHT CHINA'S RULERS IN THE CLASSIC RULER'S DILEMMA.  ANY FURTHER DEEPENING OF ECONOMIC REFORM IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SOME ACCOMPANYING REFORM OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE -- AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION HAS PROVED DEADLY FOR MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEMS.

ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS ALSO SET OFF A SEA-CHANGE IN CHINESE STRATEGIC THINKING.  TODAY, CHINA'S AMBITION IS TO PROJECT POWER -- BEYOND MAINLAND EAST ASIA, WHERE ITS STRATEGIC AUTHORITY IS ALREADY WIDELY ACCEPTED -- INITIALLY INTO EAST ASIA'S MARITIME REGIONS, AND ULTIMATELY INTO THE WORLD-OCEAN.

BECAUSE CHINA HAS BEEN A LAND-POWER SINCE THE EARLY 15TH CENTURY, ITS BUILD-UP OF SEA- AND AIR-POWER IS LIABLE TO BECOME ASIA'S KEY SECURITY ISSUE OVER THESE NEXT 10-15 YEARS.  ALREADY OTHER POWERS WITH MARITIME INTERESTS -- LIKE INDIA AND JAPAN -- ARE BEGINNING TO REACT TO WHAT THEY MUST SEE AS A THREAT TO THEIR OWN SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION.

THE SPRATLYS AND TAIWAN STRAITS PROBLEMS ARE VITAL COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S MARITIME INTERESTS.

HOW CHINA EXERCISES ITS POTENTIAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER MUST CONCERN ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC -- AND NONE MORE SO THAN WE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHO LIE IN THE DIRECTION OF ITS HISTORICAL EXPANSION.

THIS IS WHY WE ALL HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF CHINA'S MARKET EXPERIMENT.  WE WANT THE MARKET SYSTEM TO COMPLETE INDUCING THE SPONTANEOUS DEMOCRATIZATION ALREADY GOING ON IN VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS, IN THE MASS MEDIA, EVEN IN THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS -- BECAUSE A PLURALISTIC CHINA WILL NOT SPRING ANY SURPRISES ON ITS NEIGHBORS.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS:  A CHINESE POINT OF VIEW

THE TAIWAN ISSUE IS PROBABLY THE ONLY ISSUE THAT CAN IGNITE A MAJOR MILITARY CONFLICT BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON.  NOW THAT BEIJING NO LONGER PROMOTES "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," CHINESE PEOPLE ARE REDISCOVERING THEIR NATIONALISM.

WU XINBO, A PROFESSOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DEPARTMENT OF FUDAN UNIVERSITY IN SHANGHAI, ARGUES THAT CHINA'S REUNIFICATION IS A KEY ELEMENT IN CHINESE NATION-BUILDING, WHILE FOR THE UNITED STATES IT IS MERELY A GEOPOLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL ISSUE.

WHEREVER THE U.S. HAS CONFRONTED NATIONALISM, IT HAS SELDOM SUCCEEDED:  VIETNAM WOULD BE A KEY EXAMPLE.  THUS, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT CONFRONT CHINESE NATIONALISM OVER TAIWAN.  ONLY AFTER THE TAIWAN ISSUE IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY WILL CHINA BECOME A STATUS QUO POWER.

UNTIL THIS HAPPENS, BEIJING WILL REMAIN SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. SECURITY PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA AND WILL BE UNWILLING TO ENDORSE OR FOLLOW U.S. LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC INITIATIVES IN BOTH REGIONAL AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS.

UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE RESUMPTION OF "NORMAL STATE" STATUS FOR JAPAN WILL MAKE SUSTAINING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON A LARGE SCALE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY FOR WASHINGTON POLICY-MAKERS, EITHER AT HOME OR IN EAST ASIA.

AS THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CHANGES, WASHINGTON SHOULD SEEK NEW WAYS OF ASSERTING ITS INFLUENCE.  U.S. SECURITY INVOLVEMENT WILL HAVE TO TRANSFORM BOTH IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

THE FORWARD U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE MAY DECLINE, CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL POLICY TO CUT DOWN CURRENT DEPLOYMENT LEVELS ABROAD.  WASHINGTON SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE POLITICAL RATHER THAN THE MILITARY FUNCTION OF ITS ALLIANCE STRUCTURE.

WU XINBO ALSO BELIEVES A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY WILL VERY LIKELY EMERGE.  AN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY COMMUNITY IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE STATES IN THE REGION HAVE SHARED INTERESTS IN A PEACEFUL AND STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, AND BECAUSE THEY BENEFIT INCREASINGLY FROM GROWING ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS.

THE CHINESE BELIEVE JAPAN IS WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF AMENDING ITS PEACE CONSTITUTION.  THEY ALSO SAY IT HAS REMARKABLY INCREASED ITS MILITARY CAPACITY.

BUT FOR ASIA'S LONG-TERM STABILITY, JAPAN MUST REMAIN TRUE TO ITS PACIFIST CONSTITUTION. IT MUST ABIDE BY  ITS KEY ROLE AS ASIA'S ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMO, AND NOT BECOME A MILITARY POWER.

ON THE ISSUE OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) SYSTEMS IN EAST ASIA, THE CHINESE ARGUE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD REALIZE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS "ABSOLUTE SECURITY."  WHILE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS MAY IMPROVE DEFENSE, IT ALSO ENHANCES OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

BY INSTALLING TMD, THE U.S. WILL ALTER THE EXISTING STRATEGIC BALANCE AND START OFF A NEW ARMS RACE.  IN ANY CASE, PYONGYANG'S MELLOWING MAKES THE OSTENSIBLE REASON FOR DEPLOYING TMD IN EAST ASIA -- COPING WITH PYONGYANG'S MISSILE THREAT -- NO LONGER SUSTAINABLE.

PROFESSOR WU AGREES THAT BEIJING NEEDS TO ASSURE THE U.S. AND OTHER POWERS THAT IT DOES NOT INTEND TO UPSET THE EXISTING REGIONAL ORDER; AND THAT FOR AS LONG AS ITS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS ARE ACCOMMODATED, IT CAN LIVE WITH A REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE IN WHICH THE U.S. PLAYS A LEADING ROLE.

PROFESSOR WU ACCEPTS THAT BEIJING SHOULD GIVE THE U.S. CREDIT FOR RESISTING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN ASIA IN THE 1970s AND 1980s.  AND EVEN IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD, THE U.S. IS AN IMPORTANT FORCE FOR ASIAN STABILITY.  BEIJING SHOULD ASSURE THE U.S. AND THE REGION THAT AS A LONG-TERM STRATEGY, IT IS NOT OUT TO DRIVE U.S. OUT OF EAST ASIA .

CHINA SHOULD PROMOTE SECURITY-COMMUNITY BUILDING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND ENCOURAGE THE U.S. AND OTHER POWERS TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE IN SUCH AN ENDEAVOR.  CHINA SHOULD HEED EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS THAT POINT TOWARD GREATER REGIONAL INTEGRATION.

CHINA SHOULD ACCEPT U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON THE CONDITION THAT THESE ARE NOT TARGETED ON CHINA -- AND FOR AS LONG AS THEY PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY IN PRACTICE.

CHINA'S THIRD DEFENSE WHITE PAPER, ISSUED LAST OCTOBER, SUGGESTS THAT BEIJING'S OFFICIAL VIEW IS VERY DIFFERENT.  BEIJING'S TWO STRATEGIC GOALS:  UNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN AS THE LAST IRREDENTIST CLAIM, TO END "150 YEARS OF HUMILIATION AT THE HANDS OF FOREIGNERS"; AND GAINING CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC SHIPPING LANES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA NOW PROMOTES NATIONALISM AS THE NEW STATE IDEOLOGY -- AND THE U.S. IS ITS CHIEF ENEMY.  CHINA APPARENTLY REGARDS THE U.S. AS STRONG AND SOMETIMES ARROGANT; AND THE OVERALL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AS SHAKY.  THE U.S. IS NOW ROUTINELY IDENTIFIED AS "CHINA'S ENEMY NO. 1"; AS THE OBSTACLE TO CHINA'S RISE AS AN ASIAN POWER.  CHINESE EXPERTS NOW OPENLY DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A WAR WITH U.S. OVER TAIWAN, SOMETIME IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS.

THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW:
"THREATS ARE IN ASIA"

"THE THREATS ARE IN ASIA," SAYS A PENTAGON STUDY OF THE U.S. SECURITY PROBLEMS IN 2025.  EARLIER THAN THAT, IT APPARENTLY SEES NO CHINA THREAT.  CHINA IS PREPARING TO FIGHT A HIGH-TECH WAR AGAINST TECHNOLOGICALLY-SUPERIOR ENEMIES BUT "SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS" WILL LEAVE IT UNABLE TO CHALLENGE THE U.S. FOR "AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME," ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON STUDY RELEASED LAST JUNE 2000.

IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, CHINESE STRATEGISTS APPARENTLY USE AS THE DOMINANT SCENARIO  A WAR WITH TAIWAN THAT INVOLVES THE U.S., AND ARE POURING RESOURCES INTO DEVISING STRATEGIES AND WEAPONS TO EXPLOIT U.S. WEAKNESSES.

WHERE, DURING THE COLD WAR, THEY WERE ALLIES AGAINST THE USSR, U.S. AND CHINA NOW APPARENTLY SEE THEMSELVES AS POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES.  AND U.S. MILITARY ATTENTION IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONAL FOCUS ON EUROPE -- AND LOOKING TO EAST ASIA AS THE MOST LIKELY ARENA OF FUTURE MILITARY COMPETITION.  THE PENTAGON SEES NO FORESEEABLE CONFLICTS IN EUROPE AS THREATENING VITAL U.S. INTERESTS.
THE EMERGING QUESTIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGISTS ARE:

1. WHAT TO DO AFTER A KOREAN RAPPROCHEMENT?

2. WHAT TO DO ABOUT CHINA'S EMERGENCE AS A GREAT POWER WITH SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER THE REST OF EAST ASIA?

THE FIRST QUESTION HAS TO DO WITH THE FUTURE OF U.S. FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA -- HOW TO ENSURE U.S. DEPLOYMENTS THERE WILL STILL BE WELCOME IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND IN JAPAN, EVEN IF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT DISAPPEARS.

TO THAT QUESTION IS ADDED THE COMPLICATION THAT, AFTER A RESTORATION OF STABILITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA, JAPAN MIGHT NO LONGER UNQUESTIONINGLY FOLLOW THE U.S. LEAD IN EAST ASIAN POLICIES.

WASHINGTON APPARENTLY HOPES THAT, BY CONCEDING MORE LEGAL AUTHORITY OVER THE U.S. PERSONNEL TO HOST-GOVERNMENTS UNDER "STATUS OF FORCES" AGREEMENTS; AND BY AGREEING TO THE "JOINT OPERATION" OF U.S. BASES IN KOREA AND JAPAN, U.S. COULD MAINTAIN ITS FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN JAPAN AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION -- ONE OF WHOSE PURPOSES WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT EMERGENT JAPAN CONTINUES TO BE A WELL-BEHAVED POWER.

EVEN IN THE ASEAN REGION, WASHINGTON NO LONGER SEEKS PERMANENT BASES.  IT IS CONTENT WITH OCCASIONAL ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH LOCAL TROOPS -- AS IN THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES.  THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAS JOINT EXERCISES WITH AUSTRALIANS; WITH THAILAND, AND THIS YEAR, ALSO WITH SINGAPORE.  SINGAPORE IS BUILDING A NEW PIER FOR U.S. NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.  THE UNITED STATES IS APPARENTLY ALSO INTERESTED IN THE SAME ARRANGEMENTS WITH VIETNAM.

THIS EARLY, WASHINGTON'S EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE ALREADY FRETTING ABOUT THE U.S. FOCUS ON ASIA.  THE EUROPEAN UNION IS ORGANIZING AN E.U. FORCE OF 60,000 MEN -- TO INTERVENE IN EUROPEAN CRISES AND TO PROJECT E.U. POWER ABROAD.  MOST OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSETS ARE STILL IN THE E.U.

ASIA-PACIFIC'S NEED FOR CONTINUED AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT

THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC CENTER OF GRAVITY HAS SHIFTED FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC.  THE EUROPEAN UNION IS LIKELY TO BE INWARD-LOOKING OVER THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE -- WHILE EXPORT-ORIENTED ASIA HAS BEGUN ONCE AGAIN TO GROW RAPIDLY.  ALREADY, U.S. TRADE WITH EAST ASIA EXCEEDS ITS TRADE WITH WESTERN EUROPE.

NO COMBINATION OF EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES CAN BALANCE THAT OF CHINA.  THERE, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AS "THE BALANCER" IS CRUCIAL IF ASIAN COUNTRIES ARE TO HAVE ELBOW ROOM FOR THEMSELVES.

IT IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF NORTH KOREA -- NOR OF CHINA -- TO HAVE THE NORTH ABSORBED BY THE SOUTH.

BUT THE GREATER DANGER TO EAST ASIA LIES IN A CLASH OF ARMS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAITS.  THIS COULD CHANGE THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE WHOLE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO HANOI MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF AMERICA'S EFFORT TO ENLIST VIETNAM AS A COUNTERWEIGHT IN CONTAINING CHINA -- THE SOUTHERN COUNTERPART OF KOREA.  THE VIETNAM WAR WAS A PRODUCT OF THE AMERICAN MISCONCEPTION THAT A "COMMUNIST" VIETNAM WOULD BE THE PAWN OF A "COMMUNIST" CHINA.  IN BOTH CASES, NATIONALISM WAS A MUCH STRONGER MOTIVE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ACTION.

AFTER ALL, VIETNAM'S NATIONHOOD HAS BEEN DEFINED BY ITS 2000-YEAR-RESISTANCE TO CHINESE INCORPORATION.  TODAY, HANOI IS ATTRACTED TO AN ALLIANCE WITH WASHINGTON BY THE SAME APPREHENSION OF THE CHINESE EMBRACE.

THE COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN FORCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC, ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, IS MOVING THE EMPHASIS IN EAST ASIAN ALLIANCES FROM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS TO MULTILATERAL REGIONAL COOPERATION FOCUSED ON "SHARED INTERESTS IN PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT" AND IN COMBATING "COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES" POSED BY DRUG-TRAFFICKING, PIRACY, TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND NATURAL DISASTERS.

THE THREE YEARLY BILATERAL EXERCISES -- WITH AUSTRALIA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES -- WILL BE LINKED IN MID-2001 UNDER AN UMBRELLA STRATEGY INVOLVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER-RELIEF SCENARIOS.

INDONESIA IS APPARENTLY INTENT ON EXPANDING ITS NAVY BY 20,000 SAILORS AND 10,000 MARINES IN 5 YEARS.  SINGAPORE'S FIRST SUBMARINE WAS TRANSPORTED TO ITS HOME BASE IN APRIL; AND A SECOND WILL FOLLOW IN 2001.

WHAT CAN EAST ASIA EXPECT FROM A BUSH PRESIDENCY?

ON ARMS CONTROL, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JR. PROPOSES TO CONSIDER UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL -- WHILE BUILDING A SHIELD AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN THAT ENVISIONED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (WHICH WOULD BE SHARED WITH U.S. ALLIES AND PERHAPS EVEN WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA).  WE MAY EXPECT MOVES TO END A 1972 TREATY WITH MOSCOW THAT PROHIBITS ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE.  BUT THE MISSILE-DEFENSE SHIELD CANNOT APPARENTLY BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TIME-FRAME OF 2005 SET BY THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MAY MAKE THE FOLLOWING KEY MOVES IN FOREIGN RELATIONS:

1. REVIVING CLOSER WORKING RELATIONS WITH JAPAN ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES.

2. PRESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION TO RAISE DEFENSE SPENDING (FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND PREPARATION FOR HIGH-TECH WARFARE) AND TO ALIGN ITS DEFENSE PREPARATIONS MORE CLOSELY WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).  (E.U. RAPID-REACTION FORCE TO TAKE OVER PEACEKEEPING IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO.)

3. EMPHASIZING STRONG U.S. NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, A BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO TAKE UNILATERAL INITIATIVES, EVEN WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS OR ALLIED SUPPORT.  IT WILL ACT TO COUNTER BEIJING'S MILITARY THREATS TO TAIWAN, WHILE EMPHASIZING BENEFITS TO CHINA OF NEWLY-INSTITUTIONALIZED TRADE TIES.  IT MIGHT ALSO OPEN TOWARD IRAN AS ALLY AGAINST IRAQ AND AS PIPELINE TO CASPIAN SEA OIL.

TOWARD THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, BUSH ADVISERS HAVE A MORE LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDE.  THEY WILL BE LESS LIKELY THAN THE ACTIVIST CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO INTERVENE, SHOULD FINANCIAL CRISES BREAK OUT IN OTHER COUNTRIES.  PRESIDENT BUSH IS ALSO MORE LIKELY TO GET CONGRESS BACKING FOR A NEW ROUND OF GLOBAL TALKS TO LIBERALIZE INTERNATIONAL TRADE (THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS -- THE URUGUAY ROUND -- CREATED THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN 1994).

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO MORE LIKELY TO BACK A PROPOSAL TO SCALE BACK DRASTICALLY THE IMF'S ROLE IN BAILING OUT DEVELOPING ECONOMIES IN TROUBLE.  AT HOME, IT IS ALSO MORE INCLINED THAN THE DEMOCRATS TO STIMULATE THE U.S. ECONOMY WITH TAX CUTS AND HIGHER SPENDING.

OVER THESE NEXT FOUR YEARS, TECHNOLOGICALLY-DRIVEN CHANGES ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE IMPORTANT IN TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ECONOMY  THAN ANY INITIATIVE BY WASHINGTON.  HEAVY INVESTMENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HAVE NEARLY DOUBLED AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY FROM WHAT IT WAS IN THE EARLY 1990s.

III.  TOWARD AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIVALRIES CONTINUE TO WEAKEN THE STABILITY OF EAST ASIA.  BUT EVENTS IN THE WORLD MAKE CLEAR THERE ARE NO ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY.  OUR COMMON OBJECT SHOULD BE TO REPLACE THE "BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER" AS THE ORGANIZER OF STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN EAST ASIA AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC WITH THE "BALANCE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT."

THE INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING THIS IDEAL ARE ALREADY ON THE GROUND.  THEY ARE THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY DISCUSSION, AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) GROUPING.  THE TWO ARE COMPLEMENTARY -- TYING TOGETHER OTHERWISE DISPARATE STATES IN NETWORKS OF COMMON PURPOSE.

IN MY OPINION, APEC ITSELF SHOULD INTEGRATE SECURITY AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN ITS DELIBERATIONS.  DOING SO WILL MAKE IT A MORE DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION -- ONE ABLE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CENTURY.

FORMAL UNIFICATION ONLY THE BEGINNING

EVEN FOR ASEAN, FORMAL UNIFICATION OF THE 10 SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES IS MERELY THE BEGINNING.  ASEAN HAS YET TO EVOLVE INTO A GENUINE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNITY.  ITS NATION-STATES STILL MUST LEARN TO HOLD THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST ABOVE THEIR OWN -- IN THE SPIRIT THE 1976 BALI TREATY CALLS "VOLUNTARY SELF-DENIAL."

LINGERING PROBLEMS MUST BE DEALT WITH.  POLITICAL RIVALRIES AND MUTUAL SUSPICIONS LEFT OVER FROM COLONIAL HISTORY MUST BE OVERCOME.  IRREDENTIST CLAIMS MUST BE RESOLVED FINALLY.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS BEEN A WATERSHED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.  IT HAS STRAINED THE UNITY AND THE MUTUAL TRUST ASEAN HAD BUILT UP THESE PAST 32 YEARS.  CERTAINLY ASEAN ITSELF WILL EMERGE FROM THE CRISIS DIFFERENT IN SOME WAYS FROM WHAT IT ORIGINALLY WAS.

FOR INSTANCE, THAILAND HAS ALREADY ASKED FOR A REEXAMINATION OF ASEAN'S CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS -- ARGUING RIGHTLY THAT DOMESTIC EVENTS IN ONE ASEAN COUNTRY COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT A NEIGHBOR-STATE.

ACCOMMODATING THE AMBITIONS OF THE RISING POWERS

IN THE LARGER EAST ASIAN AND ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONS, I SEE AS THE KEY TO LASTING PEACE IN THIS NEW CENTURY THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE AMBITIONS OF THE RISING POWERS -- CHINA THE GREATEST AMONG THEM -- FOR INFLUENCE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS.

SINCE WE WANT NO SECOND COLD WAR IN OUR PART OF THE WORLD, WE MUST ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT CHINA'S EARLY AND FULL INVOLVEMENT  IN THE REGIONAL ORDER ON AN EQUITABLE AND NON-DISRUPTIVE BASIS.

FINDING A PRACTICAL WAY OF DOING THIS WILL NOT BE EASY.  FORTUNATELY, WE HAVE THE LEISURE TO DO SO.  NONE OF THE GREAT POWERS FACES AN IMMEDIATE THREAT; AND RIVALRY AMONG THEM HAS LOST ITS IDEOLOGICAL EDGE.

MEANWHILE, UNIFYING FORCES ARE AT WORK.  GROWING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE MAY NOT GUARANTEE PEACE AND STABILITY -- BUT IT DOES CREATE AN INCENTIVE FOR AVOIDING CONFLICTS BY RAISING THEIR COSTS.
NOW THAT THE WORLD'S CENTER OF GRAVITY IS SHIFTING BACK TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC, IT IS PERHAPS TIME FOR OUR STATESMEN TO START CONCEPTUALIZING THE COMPONENTS OF A PAX PACIFICA.  AND THIS MUST BE THE STABILITY -- NOT OF ANY SINGLE POWER'S HEGEMONY -- BUT BY THE PEACE OF VIRTUAL EQUALS, THE PRODUCT OF SECURITY COOPERATION THAT COMES -- IN THE WORDS OF THE PROPHET ISAIAH -- "FROM SITTING DOWN AND REASONING TOGETHER."

THANK YOU AND MABUHAY (BEST WISHES)!